Skills/PyPI/questions-mcp-server

questions-mcp-server@1.1.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "题目管理与检索系统 MCP Server - 基于 FastMCP 框架" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher yourusername · publishing for 712 daysInstalls 71Last detonated 28 min ago
$claude mcp add questions-mcp-server -- uvx questions-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
EMBEDDING_API_KEYEXTERNAL_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AUTO_BACKUP_ENABLED, BATCH_SIZE, CACHE_ENABLED, CHROMA_COLLECTION_NAME, CHROMA_PERSIST_DIR, CONSISTENCY_CHECK_ENABLED, EMBEDDING_API_ENDPOINT, EMBEDDING_CACHE_SIZE, EMBEDDING_MODEL, ENVIRONMENT, ERROR_LOG_FILE_PATH, EXTERNAL_API_ENDPOINT, LOG_FILE_PATH, MAX_RETRIES, MOCK_EMBEDDING, QUERY_CACHE_SIZE, RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED, SERVER_HOST, SERVER_PORT, SQLITE_DB_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for EMBEDDING_API_KEY, EXTERNAL_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx questions-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:65 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 编辑.env文件，设置必要的API密钥Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/core/config.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:301 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- 检查 `.env` 文件是否存在且包含必需的环境变量Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrun_all_tests.py:18 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files└── .env.example # 环境变量示例Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/core/config.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""加载 .env 文件"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `config/config.yaml` 与 `.env`：服务与环境配置Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_export_service.py:366 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexport_service.delete_export_file("../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_database.py:174 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system(f'rmdir /s /q "{self.temp_dir}" 2>nul || true')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtest_mcp_connection.py:23 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_database.py:297 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system(f'rmdir /s /q "{self.temp_dir}" 2>nul || true')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,468 tok
3 files · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.