Skills/PyPI/qcoda-mcp

qcoda-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "QCoda MCP server + CLI — manage QCoda work items, pipelines, concerns, and PM config from AI coding tools (Claude Code, Cursor, JetBrains, aider) over stdio." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 724 daysInstalls 49Last detonated 57 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
QCODA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: QCODA_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_repo_map.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "add", rel], cwd=repo, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedqcoda_mcp/repo.py:11 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_qc_eval_runner.py:242 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesdoesn't kill the whole suite run."""Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_repo_map.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "commit.gpgsign", "false"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_accept_build.py:80 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingmsg = "https://user:[email protected]/repo"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ledger_status.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_phase_e_smoke.py:300 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsqcoda_mcp/repo.py:41 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakinghttps://user:[email protected]/org/repo.git -> github.com/org/repoFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_repo_map.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_repo_map.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "QCoda Test"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedqcoda_mcp/repo.py:25 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_plan_exec.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "test@qcoda"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_plan_exec.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_base_agent.py:629 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesroutes = "GET /api/v1/projects/list.json\nPOST /api/v1/projects/create"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_accept_build.py:43 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert _validate_branch_name("main;rm -rf /") is FalseFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_accept_build.py:43 · Destructive file system command detectedassert _validate_branch_name("main;rm -rf /") is FalseFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_accept_build.py:64 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingmsg = "Clone failed: https://x-token-auth:[email protected]/org/repo"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_impl_plan.py:124 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd", # absoluteFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_llm_retry_d103.py:441 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingassert url == "https://user:[email protected]/x/y.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_plan_exec.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "add", "."], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_mcp.py:35 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingassert normalize_repo_url("https://user:[email protected]/org/repo.git") == "github.com/org/repo"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_auto_code_triage.py:293 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"path": "../etc/passwd", "action": "CREATE", "content": "oops"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_accept_build.py:58 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingmsg = "Failed: https://user:[email protected]/repo/project.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_repo_map.py:25 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "test@qcoda"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ledger_update.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_plan_exec.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "commit.gpgsign", "false"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_plan_exec.py:44 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "QCoda Test"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_self_fix.py:40 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "commit.gpgsign", "false"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_self_fix.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_spec_gen_tools.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(tmp_path), "add", "."], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_spec_gen_tools.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", "-b", "main", str(tmp_path)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_spec_gen_tools.py:72 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_spec_gen_tools.py:158 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat_file(tmp_repo, "../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_self_fix.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "QCoda"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_spec_gen_tools.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_scope_manifest.py:120 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_spec_gen_tools.py:162 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescat_file(tmp_repo, "/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesREADME.md:520 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file…dex) plus per-fact files under `.qcoda/memory/`. All tools read this directory. Edit files directly to update; `MEMORY.md` is loaded into every session via the wrappers' read-only injection. **One-tim…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_self_fix.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "test@qcoda"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_self_fix.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "add", "."], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_spec_gen_tools.py:47 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈74 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for qcoda-mcp@0.1.0 as of 25 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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