Skills/PyPI/qai-consultant-mcp

qai-consultant-mcp@3.9.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Local, keyless MCP server: standards-grounded QA knowledge retrieval (ISTQB, OWASP, IEEE, ISO, EU AI Act), deterministic QA effort estimation, QA document quality review, test-results health analysis, and QA process maturity assessment." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher gvasile29 · publishing for 123 daysInstalls 1,125Last detonated 58 min ago
$claude mcp add qai-consultant-mcp -- uvx qai-consultant-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso posthog.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx qai-consultant-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectionknowledge_base/methodologies/BDD_TDD.md:3 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileSource: Compiled from Dan North (BDD originator), Kent Beck (TDD originator), and industry best practices.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/qai_consultant/core/results_core.py:242 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contenttext = (content or "").lstrip("")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/qai_consultant/core/effort_core.py:1 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionknowledge_base/articles/ai_sdlc/article_19_a_systematic_literature_review_on_the_impact_of_ai.md:283 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- Jailbreak and exploit preventionFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionknowledge_base/methodologies/BDD_TDD.md:73 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileBDD was created by Dan North as an answer to "what should I test?" — focusing on behaviors rather than implementation.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈98 tok
1 file · 78 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for qai-consultant-mcp@3.9.3 as of 25 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.