python-docs-mcp-server@0.4.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "The canonical Python stdlib oracle for AI coding agents — exact symbols, exact sections, exact versions, offline, always free, always MIT, token-frugal." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
sudoers = Path("/etc/sudoers.d/python-docs-vision")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.signature = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.from mcp_server_python_docs.errors import DocsServerErrorFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.from mcp_server_python_docs.services.package_docs import PackageDocsServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.of 1620 seconds and short yields with process polling; do not kill a live reviewFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rev_parse = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Run from a reviewed checkout as sudo python3 ops/vision/install.py. This preparesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.run = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.raise PermissionError("Run through the trusted operator's sudo session")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/pkill", "-KILL", "-u", str(account.pw_uid)], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.check_output(["git", *args])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["/usr/bin/pkill", "-KILL", "-u", str(account.pw_uid)], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(args, check=True, env=ENV, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.monkeypatch.setattr("mcp_server_python_docs.storage.db.assert_fts5_available", no_fts5)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.from mcp_server_python_docs.services.package_docs import PackageDocsServiceFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.from mcp_server_python_docs.errors import DocsServerErrorFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.text = "\u65e5\u672c\u8a9e\u30c6\u30b9\u30c8" # 日本語テストFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.from mcp_server_python_docs.errors import DocsServerError, PageNotFoundErrorFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.from mcp_server_python_docs.errors import DocsServerError, PageNotFoundError, VersionNotFoundErrorFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.from mcp_server_python_docs.storage.db import assert_fts5_availableFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them."mcp_server_python_docs.server._assert_fts5",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for python-docs-mcp-server@0.4.1 as of 25 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aymen-hammouda-hammouda.aymen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.