Skills/PyPI/pyjo-mcp

pyjo-mcp@0.2.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server and client for Pyjoyment." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pyjoyment · publishing for 20 daysInstalls 297Last detonated 36 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 15 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso metacpan.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx Pyjo-MCP

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Pyjo'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Pyjo'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Pyjo'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Pyjo'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Pyjo'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Pyjo'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'Pyjo'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: SyntaxError: invalid syntax
0.4sprocess8 of 15 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_ResourceTemplate.py:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesis_ok(template.match('file:///project/../etc/passwd'), None, 'parent')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_ResourceTemplate.py:114 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesis_ok(template.resource('file:///project/../etc/passwd'), None, 'no resource')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsPyjo/MCP/Test.py:521 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest = t.resource_exists_not('file:///etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Server.py:537 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestf.read_resource_ok('unsafe:///../etc/passwd').result_is('/contents/0/text', 'Unsafe ../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Server.py:536 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestf.read_resource_ok('file:///project//etc/passwd').status_is(200).error_message_is('Resource not found')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Client.py:292 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesresult = client.call_tool('delete', {'path': 'a.txt'}, input_responses=responses, request_state=state)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_ResourceTemplate.py:104 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesis_ok(template.match('file:///project/docs/../../etc/passwd'), None, 'parent in the middle')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_ResourceTemplate.py:109 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesis_ok(template.match('file:///project//etc/passwd'), None, 'absolute path')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Server.py:534 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestf.read_resource_ok('file:///project/../etc/passwd').status_is(200)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Server.py:535 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestf.error_is({'code': -32602, 'message': 'Resource not found', 'data': {'uri': 'file:///project/../etc/passwd'}})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Client.py:312 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesresult = client.call_tool('delete', {'path': 'a.txt'}, input_responses=responses, request_state=state)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsPyjo/MCP/Test.py:522 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest = t.resource_exists_not('file:///etc/passwd', 'no secrets')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsPyjo/MCP/ResourceTemplate.py:220 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfiles.match('file:///project/../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_ResourceTemplate.py:107 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesis_ok(template.match('file:///project/%2E%2E/etc/passwd'), None, 'encoded parent')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedt/sdk/MCP_SDK.py:237 · Python subprocess execution detectedserver = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Tool.py:189 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesThe :mod:`Pyjo.JSON.Schema` of the arguments, the ``inputSchema`` ofFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Test.py:227 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest.read_resource_ok('file:///etc/passwd').error_code_is(-32602).error_message_is('Resource not found')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Client.py:285 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesis_ok(result['inputRequests']['ok']['params']['message'], 'Delete a.txt?', 'request of the input')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Test.py:221 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest.resource_is('file:///etc/passwd', None)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Server.py:646 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesta.call_ok('delete', path='a.txt').input_ok({'confirm': {'action': 'accept'}})Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Test.py:292 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filest.call_ok('delete', path='a.txt').result_is('/resultType', 'input_required')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Client.py:400 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files:class:`Pyjo.JSON.RPC.Error` of the response, with the input of theFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Tool.py:147 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput = Pyjo.JSON.Schema.new(dict(output_schema))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Client.py:298 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesc.call_tool_p('confirm', {'path': 'a.txt'}, input_responses={'ok': {'action': 'decline'}}).then(Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Server.py:631 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesta.mcp_ok('tools/call', {'name': 'delete', 'arguments': {'path': 'a.txt'}, 'inputResponses': []})Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Test.py:228 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest.error_is('/data/uri', 'file:///etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Test.py:323 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filest.call_ok('delete', path='a.txt').input_ok({'confirm': {'action': 'decline'}}).text_content_is('Cancelled')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Server.py:1211 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesraise Pyjo.JSON.RPC.Error.new(Pyjo.JSON.RPC.INVALID_PARAMS, 'Invalid input responses')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathst/MCP_Test.py:215 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest.resource_exists_not('file:///etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingt/sdk/MCP_SDK.py:21 · Dynamic module loadingif not importlib.util.find_spec('mcp'):Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Test.py:320 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filest.call_ok('delete', path='a.txt').status_is(200).result_is('/resultType', 'input_required')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Test.py:324 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filest.call_ok('delete', path='a.txt').input_ok().result_is('/resultType', 'input_required', 'no responses')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Server.py:619 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesta.call_ok('delete', path='a.txt').input_ok({'confirm': {'action': 'decline'}}).text_content_is('Cancelled')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathst/docs/MCP_Test.py:348 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest = t.resource_exists_not('file:///etc/passwd', 'no secrets')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionPyjo/MCP/Tool.py:136 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesschema = Pyjo.JSON.Schema.new(dict(input_schema))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/docs/MCP_Test.py:246 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filest.call_ok('delete', path='a.txt').result_is('/resultType', 'input_required')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiont/MCP_Client.py:286 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesresult = c.call_tool('confirm', {'path': 'a.txt'}, input_responses={'ok': {'action': 'accept'}})Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathst/docs/MCP_Test.py:347 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filest = t.resource_exists_not('file:///etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 48 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for Pyjo-MCP@0.2.0 as of 13 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pyjoyment: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim pyjoymentPropose a patch to the maintainer