pydocs-mcp@0.8.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Local, version-aware code & docs search with hybrid retrieval and reference graphs for your AI coding agent, accelerated with Rust" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso python.org, pydantic.dev, numpy.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
sudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo update-alternatives --set libblas.so.3-x86_64-linux-gnu \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo apt-get install -y libopenblas-pthread-dev # see INSTALL.md for fallbacksFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Load KEY=VALUE lines from a .env into os.environ (for the tree notebook'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y libopenblas-pthread-devFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get install -y libopenblas-pthread-dev liblapack-devFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f.write_text("# \u65e5\u672c\u8a9e\u30c6\u30b9\u30c8", encoding="utf-8")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.def load_dotenv(path: str | os.PathLike = "../.env") -> bool:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo apt-get install -y libopenblas-pthread-dev liblapack-devFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.`<system> / <config> (<label>) [<git_sha>, n=<tasks>]`, so a figure staysFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.swallowed and the user has to ``kill -9`` the process.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for pydocs-mcp@0.8.1 as of 44 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim msobroza: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.