Skills/PyPI/pyapple-mcp

pyapple-mcp@1.6.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server and command-line tool for macOS: Messages, Mail, Notes, Calendar, Reminders, Contacts, Maps and Shortcuts" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher 54yyyu · publishing for 511 daysInstalls 112Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pyapple-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_shortcuts.py:216 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run([str(fake)], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpyapple_mcp/utils/maps.py:244 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpyapple_mcp/utils/maps.py:934 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_policy.py:595 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_cli.py:1966 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files**`--body "$(cat draft.txt)"` was the only way to send a real email throughFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpyapple_mcp/utils/applescript.py:145 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:4 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesReading goes through `chat.db` directly; sending goes through AppleScript.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2538 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# to text `~/.ssh/id_rsa` to a number in the message body — and every step ofFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorypyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2538 · References a credential file in the home directory# to text `~/.ssh/id_rsa` to a number in the message body — and every step ofFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_doctor.py:868 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2613 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# `.gnupg`, `.config`, `.env`, `.git`. Nobody means to text a dotfile,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_messages_attachments.py:762 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescan be told *by that mail* to text `~/.ssh/id_rsa` to a number in the body,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:685 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli.py:1908 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_source_compiles.py:80 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_messages_attachments.py:762 · References a credential file in the home directorycan be told *by that mail* to text `~/.ssh/id_rsa` to a number in the body,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_applescript_timeout.py:75 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesNo real script here: the kill is faked, because what is being asserted isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorypyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2589 · References a credential file in the home directory`~/Desktop/holiday.jpg -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` is judged as `~/.ssh/id_rsa`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2589 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`~/Desktop/holiday.jpg -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` is judged as `~/.ssh/id_rsa`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_mail.py:594 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processescaller: `mark_as_read` must not turn the kill back into a failure report.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_applescript_escaping.py:25 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", script], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpyapple_mcp/utils/shortcuts.py:247 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpyapple_mcp/setup_helper.py:106 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_source_compiles.py:102 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpyapple_mcp/utils/messages.py:2283 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,035 tok
2 files · 65 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pyapple-mcp@1.6.1 as of 46 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 54yyyu: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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