Skills/PyPI/py-mcpdock-cli

py-mcpdock-cli@1.0.18

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Python CLI for managing MCP servers" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher yourusername · publishing for 711 daysInstalls 48Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, bun.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 52/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(sh_command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:60 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codesh_command = f"curl -LsSf '{install_url}/install.sh' | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:60 · Remote installer piped to shellsh_command = f"curl -LsSf '{install_url}/install.sh' | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:58 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(ps_command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/command_runner.py:139 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# Build the npx commandFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/utils/process_utils.py:85 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# 如果是npx -y package的格式，实际执行的可能是node命令Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/command_runner.py:125 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeverbose(f"Starting npx runner for package: {package_name}")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/config/client_config.py:150 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(full_command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, encoding='utf-8')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli/config/app_config.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from a .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/command_runner.py:117 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeCreates a runner for executing Node.js packages with npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/runners/__init__.py:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- command_runner: For running Python/Node packages using uv/npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli/utils/runtime.py:25 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([cmd_path, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/cli/commands/run.py:53 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- npx command: "npx:package_name [args]"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 38 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for py-mcpdock-cli@1.0.18 as of 46 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

28 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yourusername: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim yourusernamePropose a patch to the maintainer