Skills/PyPI/pulse-mcp

pulse-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Pulse document-extraction API as MCP tools — hosted gateway and local stdio server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 282Last detonated 57 min ago
$claude mcp add pulse-mcp -- uvx pulse-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PULSE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PULSE_PLATFORM_URL
Where it talks to
runpulse.com (its own)Also website-files.com, slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names website-files.com, slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PULSE_API_KEY only into requests to runpulse.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets PULSE_API_KEY=runpulse.com -- uvx pulse-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpulse_observability/analyst.py:754 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationpulse_mcp/login.py:47 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialspassFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspulse_mcp/config.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmodel_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=".env", extra="ignore")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationpulse_observability/datadog.py:48 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime"DD_REMOTE_CONFIGURATION_ENABLED": "false",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 34 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pulse-mcp@0.2.0 as of 34 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.