Skills/PyPI/puli-mcp-server

puli-mcp-server@0.1.48

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "a proactive security and stability guardrail for your AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Antigravity, etc.). It prevents production breakages by confronting proposed code changes with a massive, real-time database of global incidents, edge cases, and security breaches." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 72Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add puli-mcp-server -- uvx puli-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALSOPENAI_API_KEYPROXY_API_KEYPULI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: DISABLE_COLOR, GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION, GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT, LLM_MODEL, LLM_PROVIDER, LLM_TEMPERATURE, PROXY_BASE_URL, VERTEX_EMBEDDING_LOCATION, VERTEX_LOCATION, VERTEX_PROJECT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, OPENAI_API_KEY, PROXY_API_KEY, PULI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx puli-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)puli_mcp_server/mcp_server/server.py:18 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom puli_mcp_server.llm_agent.models import LLMQueryRequest, RiskAssessmentListFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)puli_mcp_server/mcp_server/server.py:14 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom puli_mcp_server.mcp_server.models import ChangeSet, CodingSessionAssessmentSummaryFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresspuli_mcp_server/proxy_client/config.py:17 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering_DEFAULT_PROXY_URL = "http://34.111.149.123"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationpuli_mcp_server/mcp_server/server.py:146 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeremote_config=_remote_config,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresspuli_mcp_server/proxy_client/config.py:17 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name_DEFAULT_PROXY_URL = "http://34.111.149.123"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationpuli_mcp_server/mcp_server/server.py:177 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeremote_config=_remote_config,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationpuli_mcp_server/mcp_server/server.py:135 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime_remote_config = proxy_client.mcp_config.get("config", {})Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈107 tok
1 file · 33 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for puli-mcp-server@0.1.48 as of 46 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.