Skills/PyPI/ps5-remoteplay-mcp

ps5-remoteplay-mcp@0.2.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that lets an LLM agent see and drive a stock PS5 over Remote Play" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 2,725Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add ps5-remoteplay-mcp -- uvx ps5-remoteplay-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso playstation.net, sonyentertainmentnetwork.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ps5-remoteplay-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/client.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(cmd, start_new_session=True, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/client.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(cmd, creationflags=detached, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/client.py:64 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(cmd, creationflags=detached | subprocess.CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hex-encoded string detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/vendor/pyremoteplay/session.py:53 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsDID_PREFIX = b"\x00\x18\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x40\x00\x80"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Hex-encoded string detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/vendor/pyremoteplay/takion_pb2.py:16 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…\x10\n\x08\x65\x63\x64h_sig\x18\t \x01(\x0c\"\xa4\x02\n\x0bInfoPayload\x12\x14\n\x0c\x65\x66\x66\x65\x63tive_bw\x18\x01 \x02(\r\x12\x0f\n\x07\x62itrate\x18\x02 \x02(\r\x12\x13\n\x0bmin…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Hex-encoded string detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/vendor/pyremoteplay/stream_packets.py:18 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsSTREAM_START = b"\x00\x00\x00\x40\x01\x00\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/viewer.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hex-encoded string detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/vendor/pyremoteplay/keys.py:2 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsHMAC_KEY_PS4 = b"\x20\xd6\x6f\x59\x04\xea\x7c\x14\xe5\x57\xff\xc5\x2e\x48\x8a\xc8"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Hex-encoded string detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/vendor/pyremoteplay/session.py:55 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsHEARTBEAT_RESPONSE = b"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\xfe\x00\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/client.py:63 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# MCP clients on Windows kill the server's whole job on exit; the daemon must outlive it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Hex-encoded string detectedsrc/ps5_remoteplay_mcp/vendor/pyremoteplay/keys.py:3 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsHMAC_KEY_PS5 = b"\x46\x46\x87\xb3\x49\xca\x8c\xe8\x59\xc5\x27\x0f\x5d\x7a\x69\xd6"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_hardware.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:3 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file… presses its buttons, over Sony's official Remote Play on your home network. No jailbreak, no capture card, one command to add it to your agent. > "Find ferrari 296 mon…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/gate.py:15 · Python subprocess execution detectedif subprocess.call([sys.executable, "-m", *step]) != 0:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈58 tok
1 file · 66 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ps5-remoteplay-mcp@0.2.2 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.