Skills/PyPI/proxmox-ops-mcp

proxmox-ops-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Proxmox VE: cluster and Ceph diagnostics, backup audits, maintenance planning and guarded write operations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher derdennis1012 · publishing for 18 daysInstalls 192Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add proxmox-ops-mcp -- uvx proxmox-ops-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso ceph.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx proxmox-ops-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/live/test_live_readonly.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``.env.example``). They never change anything on the cluster:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagetests/fixtures/pve9/apt_versions.json:79 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…This is a FUSE-based client that allows one to mount a Ceph file system without root privileges. . Because the FUSE-based client has certain inherent performance limitations,…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_cli.py:124 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(tmp_path / ".env").write_text("".join(f"PROXMOX_{line}\n" for line in planted))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/proxmox_ops_mcp/config.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Deliberately no implicit ``.env``: MCP clients start servers inside arbitraryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_cli.py:129 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert cli.main(["--env-file", str(tmp_path / ".env"), "check"]) == 0Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_cli.py:126 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescli.main(["check"]) # a .env in the working directory is ignoredFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_cli.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmonkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path) # keep a developer's .env out of the testsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈68 tok
1 file · 67 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for proxmox-ops-mcp@0.1.0 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.