Skills/PyPI/proxmox-mcp-plus

proxmox-mcp-plus@0.7.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enhanced Proxmox MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher rekklesna · publishing for 211 daysInstalls 12,202Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add proxmox-mcp-plus -- uvx proxmox-mcp-plus
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
COMMAND_POLICY_APPROVAL_TOKENCOMMAND_POLICY_HIGH_RISK_APPROVAL_TOKENMCP_API_KEYMCP_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSMCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_IP_HEADERMCP_OAUTH_DATABASE_URLMCP_OAUTH_DB_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDSMCP_OAUTH_DB_POOL_MAX_SIZEMCP_OAUTH_DB_POOL_MIN_SIZEMCP_OAUTH_ENABLEDMCP_OAUTH_ISSUERMCP_OAUTH_MAX_REGISTERED_CLIENTSMCP_OAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSMCP_OAUTH_RESOURCEMCP_OAUTH_SCOPESPROXMOX_ALLOW_NO_AUTHPROXMOX_API_KEYPROXMOX_STRICT_AUTHPROXMOX_TOKEN_NAMEPROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE or --strict-authConfiguration, not credentials: API_HOST, API_PORT, COMMAND_POLICY_HIGH_RISK_MODE, COMMAND_POLICY_MODE, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, MCPO_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS, MCPO_PATH_PREFIX, MCPO_ROOT_PATH, PROXMOX_API_TUNNEL_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, PROXMOX_API_TUNNEL_LOCAL_HOST, PROXMOX_API_TUNNEL_LOCAL_PORT, PROXMOX_API_TUNNEL_REMOTE_HOST, PROXMOX_API_TUNNEL_REMOTE_PORT, PROXMOX_API_TUNNEL_SSH_HOST, PROXMOX_HOST, PROXMOX_JOBS_POLL_CACHE_TTL, PROXMOX_JOBS_SQLITE_PATH, PROXMOX_MCP_CONFIG
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso proxmox.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names proxmox.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects COMMAND_POLICY_APPROVAL_TOKEN, COMMAND_POLICY_HIGH_RISK_APPROVAL_TOKEN, MCP_API_KEY, MCP_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_IP_HEADER, MCP_OAUTH_DATABASE_URL, MCP_OAUTH_DB_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, MCP_OAUTH_DB_POOL_MAX_SIZE, MCP_OAUTH_DB_POOL_MIN_SIZE, MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED, MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, MCP_OAUTH_MAX_REGISTERED_CLIENTS, MCP_OAUTH_REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, MCP_OAUTH_RESOURCE, MCP_OAUTH_SCOPES, PROXMOX_ALLOW_NO_AUTH, PROXMOX_API_KEY, PROXMOX_STRICT_AUTH, PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME, PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx proxmox-mcp-plus

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/proxmox_mcp/tools/containers.py:1093 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions" && chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/proxmox_mcp/tools/console/container_manager.py:198 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprefix = "sudo -n " if self.ssh_cfg.use_sudo else ""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/proxmox_mcp/core/process.py:22 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(args, stdin=stdin, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/proxmox_mcp/config/models.py:119 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesuse_sudo: bool = False # prefix pct with sudo (for non-root SSH users)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/proxmox_mcp/tools/console/container_manager.py:168 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprefix = "sudo -n " if self.ssh_cfg.use_sudo else ""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/proxmox_mcp/core/ssh_tunnel.py:145 · Python subprocess execution detectedself._process = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/proxmox_mcp/tools/containers.py:1078 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsnode, vmid, "mkdir -p /root/.ssh && chmod 700 /root/.ssh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈45 tok
1 file · 66 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for proxmox-mcp-plus@0.7.0 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.