Skills/PyPI/proxmox-mcp

proxmox-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for managing Proxmox VE infrastructure" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher josky-com · publishing for 222 daysInstalls 171Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add proxmox-mcp -- uvx proxmox-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAMEPROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUEConfiguration, not credentials: PROXMOX_ALLOW_DANGER, PROXMOX_URL, PROXMOX_VERIFY_SSL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PROXMOX_TOKEN_NAME, PROXMOX_TOKEN_VALUE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx proxmox-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.4sprocessexec .venv/bin/pip
0.4sprocessexited 127: ./setup.sh: line 25: .venv/bin/pip: No such file or directory

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_sanitization.py:15 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesanitize_identifier("node; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/proxmox_mcp/config.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(dotenv_path=os.path.join(PROJECT_ROOT, ".env"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_safety.py:29 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicecheck_safety("execute_lxc_command", {"command": "rm -rf /"}, False, safety_policy, False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_safety.py:29 · Destructive file system command detectedcheck_safety("execute_lxc_command", {"command": "rm -rf /"}, False, safety_policy, False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_sanitization.py:15 · Destructive file system command detectedsanitize_identifier("node; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Creating .env file from template..."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 4. Handle .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/admin_dashboard.py:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Error: Missing Proxmox credentials in .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f ".env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_connection.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Error: Missing environment variables in .env.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈689 tok
2 files · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for proxmox-mcp@0.1.0 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.