Skills/PyPI/protonmail-mcp

protonmail-mcp@0.4.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Proton Mail via Proton Bridge (IMAP/SMTP)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mhbxyz · publishing for 41 daysInstalls 354Last detonated 45 min ago
$claude mcp add protonmail-mcp -- uvx protonmail-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PROTONMAIL_MCP_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: PROTONMAIL_MCP_HTTP_HOST, PROTONMAIL_MCP_HTTP_PORT, PROTONMAIL_MCP_PROFILE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PROTONMAIL_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx protonmail-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:30 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chown -R app:app /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.yaml:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_USERNAME: ${PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_USERNAME:?set it in .env}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_files.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert safe_filename("../../etc/passwd") == "passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_http.py:48 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_http.py:70 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.yaml:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPROTONMAIL_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN: ${PROTONMAIL_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN:?set it in .env}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.yaml:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD: ${PROTONMAIL_BRIDGE_PASSWORD:?set it in .env}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for protonmail-mcp@0.4.1 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.