Skills/PyPI/printmcp

printmcp@0.3.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for automating the 3D printing pipeline: search/download models (Thingiverse), slice to G-code (Cura or OrcaSlicer), and manage printing (OctoPrint)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sourcebox-llc · publishing for 121 daysInstalls 78Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OCTOPRINT_API_KEYTHINGIVERSE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CFG, FMT, LAUNCH, NAME, NEW, OCTOPRINT_URL, PRINTMCP_CURA_DIR, PRINTMCP_CURA_RESOURCES, PRINTMCP_CURAENGINE, PRINTMCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR, PRINTMCP_ORCA_COMMAND, PRINTMCP_ORCA_PROFILES, XDG_DOWNLOAD_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso thingiverse.com, astral.sh, opencode.ai, octopi.local — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names thingiverse.com, astral.sh, opencode.ai, octopi.local as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OCTOPRINT_API_KEY, THINGIVERSE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx printmcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/printmcp/cura.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:376 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinfo " (copy .env.example to .env and fill in THINGIVERSE_TOKEN, and the"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsdocs/documentation/project/README.md:250 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Where do I get each credential?</b></summary> - **Thingiverse token** — Create an app at <https://www.thingiverse.com/apps/create> and copy its **ApFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/printmcp/octoprint.py:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"as environment variables or in the project .env file."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/setup-mcp.sh:250 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/printmcp/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesA .env file in the working directory (or a parent) is loaded automatically.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/printmcp/thingiverse.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"(environment variable or .env file) to its App Token."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/printmcp/octoprint.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenvironment variables (a project ``.env`` is loaded automatically). The API keyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/printmcp/orca.py:205 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_server.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert _safe_filename("../../etc/passwd") == "passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/printmcp/config.py:371 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:379 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinfo " 1. PrintMCP reads secrets from a .env in the working directory where the"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:374 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinfo " 1. Make sure your .env is set up in:"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:250 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Where do I get each credential?</b></summary> - **Thingiverse token** — Create an app at <https://www.thingiverse.com/apps/create> and copy its **ApFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# those from the project's .env at startup.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈74 tok
1 file · 68 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for printmcp@0.3.0 as of 35 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sourcebox-llc: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sourcebox-llcPropose a patch to the maintainer