prime-intellect-mcp@0.1.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server that lets Claude Code (and any MCP client) rent, drive, and terminate Prime Intellect GPU pods autonomously, with built-in spend caps." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PRIME_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PRIME_INTELLECT_MCP_STATE_DIR, PRIME_MAX_HOURLY_USD, PRIME_MAX_TOTAL_USD- Where it talks to
- primeintellect.ai (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
proc = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary><b><code>ssh: Permission denied (publickey)</code></b></summary> You haven't told Prime Intellect about your public key (or the pod was provisioned befFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."Ensure you've run `prime config set-ssh-key-path ~/.ssh/id_ed25519` "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary><b><code>PRIME_API_KEY is not set</code></b></summary> Either your Claude Code config didn't pick up the `env` block, or you typed `PRIME_API_KEY` as aFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><b><code>Quote token expired</code></b></summary> Quotes live 60 seconds; the agent waited too long between `pod_quote` and `pod_create`. Just call `poFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."Ensure you've run `prime config set-ssh-key-path ~/.ssh/id_ed25519` "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for prime-intellect-mcp@0.1.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kvrancic: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.