presto-mcp@0.1.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "PRESTO-only MCP server. Typed, sandboxed, reproducible access to PRESTO radio-astronomy tools via Docker." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 50/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
# Load .env from repo root if present. Real env vars win.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Loads settings from environment (or a sibling ``.env``) once, exposes a frozenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.docker_backend.py # argv builder + subprocess.run + timeout/killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.1. **No `shell=True`.** Build argv as a Python list. Invoke via `subprocess.run(argv, shell=False, timeout=…)`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.log.warning("docker kill failed for %s: %s", name, e)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."""Real Docker backend. Uses ``subprocess.run(..., shell=False)`` exclusively."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.load_dotenv(REPO_ROOT / ".env", override=False)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.PRESTO container. It also owns timeout-kill semantics.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.cp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- **No shell.** `subprocess.run(..., shell=False)`. Build Docker argv as a Python list. Never `bash -lc`, never `os.system`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Tests use the repo's real ``Settings`` (loaded from environment + .env). TheyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.get_manifest(tmp_path, "../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._BOM = ""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.resolve_input_path("/etc/passwd", data_root)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.read_manifest_resource(s, "../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for presto-mcp@0.1.0 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
30 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sebastian-salgado: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.