Skills/PyPI/portunusmcp

portunusmcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Zero-trust, risk-aware gateway proxy for the Model Context Protocol" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bashaarjavaid · publishing for 110 daysInstalls 29Last detonated 19 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 52/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… gateway python scripts/reset_dev_state.py --yes`. - `docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml up -d` — explicit development/demo stack. Copy `.env.d…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.prod.yml:88 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ${GATEWAY_ENV_FILE:-.env.prod.gateway}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml --profile monitoring up -d` — demo stack plus Prometheus (9090) and anonymous Grafana (3000); never production.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… gateway python scripts/reset_dev_state.py --yes`. - `docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml up -d` — explicit development/demo stack. Copy `.env.d…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…n snapshots (confirms unless `--yes`); in-container: `docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml run --rm gateway python scripts/reset_dev_state.py --y…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…n snapshots (confirms unless `--yes`); in-container: `docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml run --rm gateway python scripts/reset_dev_state.py --y…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml --profile monitoring up -d` — demo stack plus Prometheus (9090) and anonymous Grafana (3000); never production.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run_demo.py:441 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesprint(" In another terminal: docker kill -s HUP portunusmcp-demo-gateway-1")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsservices/gateway/main.py:180 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files" docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml run --rm gateway"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/benchmarks/run.py:229 · Python subprocess execution detectedrows = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_abac.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"open('/etc/passwd')",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:278 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mkdir -p /usr/local/lib/docker/cli-pluginsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run_demo.py:253 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes" keys with: docker kill -s HUP portunusmcp-demo-gateway-1)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/run_demo.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdocker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml up -d --buildFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/unit/test_auth.py:237 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicemessage["params"]["arguments"] = {"text": "rm -rf /"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/build_release_bundle.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv = (ROOT / ".env.prod.example").read_text()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationscripts/run_demo.py:442 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeprint(" (hot-reloads v2 and records the revision snapshot the simulator needs)")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandservices/gateway/main.py:251 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Policy hot-reload on SIGHUP (§8): docker kill -s HUP <gateway>.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:232 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo curl -fsSL \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/build_release_bundle.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.prod.gateway.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/release.yml:235 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod 0755 /usr/local/lib/docker/cli-plugins/docker-composeFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_policy_engine.py:254 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- "open('/etc/passwd')"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/release.yml:282 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionssudo chmod 0755 /usr/local/lib/docker/cli-plugins/docker-composeFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/run_demo.py:249 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint(" docker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml up -d --build")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/benchmarks/run.py:213 · Python subprocess execution detectedcontainers = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/build_release_bundle.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = destination / ".env.prod.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandAGENTS.md:68 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…VALIDATION`, and `audit_log.write()` escapes NUL so adversarial arguments can't kill the audit write; single-source risk thresholds — the 40/70/90 bands are compared…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/release.yml:101 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespython -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(open("/tmp/release.json")); assert d["tag"] == sys.argv[1] and d["commit"] == sys.argv[2]' "$GITHUB_REF_NAME" "${{ needs.prepare.outputs.commit }}"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run_demo.py:30 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesdocker kill -s HUP portunusmcp-demo-gateway-1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/benchmarks/run.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdocker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml up -d postgres redisFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:235 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo chmod 0755 /usr/local/lib/docker/cli-plugins/docker-composeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/reset_dev_state.py:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"postgres not reachable — run: docker compose --env-file .env.demo"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:279 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo curl -fsSL \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/reset_dev_state.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdocker compose --env-file .env.demo -f compose.demo.yml run --rm gateway \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/unit/test_policy_diff.py:16 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/reset_dev_state.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"redis not reachable — run: docker compose --env-file .env.demo"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptROADMAP.md:67 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file…tically flag instruction-injection patterns (imperative text aimed at a model, "ignore previous instructions" phrasing, hidden/zero-width unicode, encoded payloads) when a description is *…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:231 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mkdir -p /usr/local/lib/docker/cli-pluginsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandCLAUDE.md:68 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…VALIDATION`, and `audit_log.write()` escapes NUL so adversarial arguments can't kill the audit write; single-source risk thresholds — the 40/70/90 bands are compared…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationservices/gateway/main.py:251 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime# Policy hot-reload on SIGHUP (§8): docker kill -s HUP <gateway>.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/benchmarks/run.py:379 · Python subprocess execution detected"commit": subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandservices/gateway/audit_log.py:48 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesattacker arguments (item 21) — escape it so a null byte can't kill the writeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/unit/test_auth.py:237 · Destructive file system command detectedmessage["params"]["arguments"] = {"text": "rm -rf /"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈11,533 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

28 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bashaarjavaid: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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