Skills/PyPI/portunusmcp-sentinel

portunusmcp-sentinel@1.4.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Build-time security scanner for MCP servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bashaarjavaid · publishing for 110 daysInstalls 79Last detonated 20 min ago
$claude mcp add portunusmcp-sentinel -- uvx portunusmcp-sentinel
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENAI_API_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso oasis-open.org, mcp-sentinel.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names oasis-open.org, mcp-sentinel.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx portunusmcp-sentinel

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sentinel/static/semgrep/sent002.yaml:35 · Python subprocess execution detected- pattern: subprocess.run(..., shell=True, ...)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sentinel/static/traversal.py:167 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesor (path.name == ".env" or path.name.startswith(".env."))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sentinel/static/semgrep_ast.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sentinel/static/semgrep/sent002.yaml:36 · Python subprocess execution detected- pattern: subprocess.call(..., shell=True, ...)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sentinel/static/semgrep/sent002.yaml:37 · Python subprocess execution detected- pattern: subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True, ...)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sentinel/dynamic/sandbox.py:579 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sentinel/static/semgrep_adapter.py:140 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sentinel/static/workers.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocesses[rule] = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/sentinel/dynamic/prober.py:697 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Sample while stdio is still attached, before scanner shutdown can kill it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sentinel/cli.py:362 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn OutputFormat.JSON if json_output else output_formatFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sentinel/static/typescript_safety.py:524 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn environment and bool(re.fullmatch(r"process\.env\.[A-Z_][A-Z_0-9]*", text))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.