portainer-mcp@0.8.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server that gives AI assistants 53 tools to manage Portainer: deploy and update stacks, inspect and roll out Swarm services/tasks/nodes, manage containers, volumes, networks, exec commands, pull images, inspect endpoints, monitor resources, analyze logs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DB_PASSWORDPORTAINER_API_KEYPORTAINER_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: PORTAINER_DEFAULT_ENDPOINT, PORTAINER_URL, PORTAINER_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso reg.local — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names reg.local as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DB_PASSWORD, PORTAINER_API_KEY, PORTAINER_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
_text(await mcp.call_tool("portainer_containers_list", {"name_filter": "web; rm -rf /"}))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell._text(await mcp.call_tool("portainer_containers_list", {"name_filter": "web; rm -rf /"}))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("https://user:[email protected]/v2/", "reg.local"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.the shape pass, so ``CONFIG_FILE=https://u:pw@host/x`` loses itsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"),Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead."auto-update. Pass detach_from_git=true to do that deliberately, "Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.