Skills/PyPI/polardb-openapi-mcp-server

polardb-openapi-mcp-server@0.2.6

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Alibaba Cloud PolarDB OpenAPI management with slow log analysis and performance monitoring" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 255Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add polardb-openapi-mcp-server -- uvx polardb-openapi-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_IDALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRETANTHROPIC_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: RUN_MODE, SSE_BIND_HOST, SSE_BIND_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx polardb-openapi-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfixed_mcp_protocol_web.py:2787 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", "."], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfixed_mcp_protocol_web.py:2798 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([python_exe, "-m", "pip", "install", "--upgrade", "pip"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:1161 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:1191 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfixed_mcp_protocol_web.py:861 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfixed_mcp_protocol_web.py:2804 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([python_exe, "-m", "pip", "install", "-r", "requirements.txt", "--upgrade"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:1131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfixed_mcp_protocol_web.py:2808 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([python_exe, "-m", "pip", "install", "pytz"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for polardb-openapi-mcp-server@0.2.6 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

polardb-openapi-mcp-server@0.2.6 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills