Skills/PyPI/point-topic-mcp

point-topic-mcp@0.2.7

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "UK broadband data analysis MCP server with ClickHouse ontology" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher point-topic · publishing for 416 daysInstalls 390Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AUTH0_AUDIENCEAUTH0_CLIENT_IDAUTH0_CLIENT_SECRETAUTH0_DOMAINCHART_API_KEYCLICKHOUSE_PASSWORDCLIENT_SECRETPYPI_TOKENSNOWFLAKE_PASSWORD or --reveal-secretsConfiguration, not credentials: CLICKHOUSE_DATABASE, CLICKHOUSE_HOST, CLICKHOUSE_PORT, CLICKHOUSE_SECURE, CLICKHOUSE_USER, ENABLE_SNOWFLAKE, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, NEW_PATCH, PT_RESEARCH_DATABASE_URI, PT_RESEARCH_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY, SNOWFLAKE_USER
Where it talks to
point-topic.com (its own)Also fastmcp.app, brew.sh, mongodb.org, mongodb.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names fastmcp.app, brew.sh, mongodb.org, mongodb.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AUTH0_AUDIENCE, AUTH0_CLIENT_ID, AUTH0_CLIENT_SECRET, AUTH0_DOMAIN, CHART_API_KEY, CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD, CLIENT_SECRET, PYPI_TOKEN, SNOWFLAKE_PASSWORD only into requests to point-topic.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets AUTH0_AUDIENCE=point-topic.com,AUTH0_CLIENT_ID=point-topic.com,AUTH0_CLIENT_SECRET=point-topic.com,AUTH0_DOMAIN=point-topic.com,CHART_API_KEY=point-topic.com,CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD=point-topic.com,CLIENT_SECRET=point-topic.com,PYPI_TOKEN=point-topic.com,SNOWFLAKE_PASSWORD=point-topic.com -- uvx point-topic-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mongodb_connection_experiment.py:112 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mongodb_connection_experiment.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ensure we load .env from project rootFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install-mongosh.sh:27 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges…://repo.mongodb.org/apt/ubuntu $(lsb_release -cs)/mongodb-org/8.0 multiverse" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/mongodb-org-8.0.list sudo apt-ge…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install-mongosh.sh:29 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y mongodb-mongoshFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinfrastructure/auth0-setup.sh:163 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho " 1. Add the environment variables above to your .env file"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mongodb_connection_experiment.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinfrastructure/auth0-setup.sh:148 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho -e "${YELLOW}⚠ IMPORTANT: Add these to your .env file${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install-mongosh.sh:28 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mongodb_connection_experiment.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinfrastructure/auth0-setup.sh:170 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CREDENTIALS_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install-mongosh.sh:32 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif ! sudo yum install -y mongodb-mongosh 2>/dev/null && ! sudo dnf install -y mongodb-mongosh 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinfrastructure/auth0-setup.sh:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 5. Output environment variables for .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mongodb_connection_experiment.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = root / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/test.yml:13 · Remote installer piped to shellrun: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/install-mongosh.sh:26 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescurl -fsSL https://www.mongodb.org/static/pgp/server-8.0.asc | sudo gpg -o /usr/share/keyrings/mongodb-server-8.0.gpg --dearmorFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/test.yml:13 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote coderun: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinfrastructure/auth0-setup.sh:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho -e "${BLUE}Environment Variables for .env file${NC}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:388 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run mcp install src/point_topic_mcp/server_local.py -f .env # Claude DesktopFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,245 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for point-topic-mcp@0.2.7 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim point-topic: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim point-topicPropose a patch to the maintainer