Skills/PyPI/podkop-mcp

podkop-mcp@0.3.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for managing Podkop and Forkop on OpenWrt over SSH" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mikel38487 · publishing for 13 daysInstalls 1,620Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso gstatic.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx podkop-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesrc/podkop_mcp/router.py:709 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"trap 'rm -f \"$tmp\"' EXIT",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/docker/session.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/docker/session.py:90 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/docker/test_apply_openwrt.py:244 · Destructive file system command detectedemu_router.session.run("rm -f /tmp/forkop-fail-reload")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/docker/conftest.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/docker/conftest.py:68 · Python subprocess execution detectedbuild = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/docker/test_apply_openwrt.py:143 · Destructive file system command detectedemu_router.session.run("rm -f /tmp/forkop-fail-reload")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/unit/test_uci_core.py:256 · Destructive file system command detected"forkop.main; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/podkop_mcp/ssh.py:76 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig_path = Path(os.path.expanduser("~/.ssh/config"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:59 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"pyproject.toml", "mcp.json.example", ".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/docker/session.py:152 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/docker/test_apply_openwrt.py:312 · Destructive file system command detectedemu.run("rm -f /tmp/forkop-fail-reload", check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/docker/conftest.py:109 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["docker", "rm", "-f", name], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/capture_fixtures.py:65 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--ssh-config-host", default=None, help="алиас из ~/.ssh/config")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesrc/podkop_mcp/router.py:1119 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicef"ls -1t {_sh(backup_dir)}/*.uci 2>/dev/null | tail -n +{keep + 1} | while read -r f; do rm -f \"$f\" \"$f.sha256\"; done || true",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/podkop_mcp/router.py:1119 · Destructive file system command detectedf"ls -1t {_sh(backup_dir)}/*.uci 2>/dev/null | tail -n +{keep + 1} | while read -r f; do rm -f \"$f\" \"$f.sha256\"; done || true",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/unit/test_uci_core.py:256 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"forkop.main; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/docker/conftest.py:96 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_config_core.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Алиас из ~/.ssh/config допускается без прямого host."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/unit/test_config_cache.py:384 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["sh", "-c", script], capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/docker/entrypoint.sh:7 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /var/run/ubus/ubus.sockFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/docker/Dockerfile:14 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod +x /usr/bin/forkop /etc/init.d/forkop /entrypoint.sh \Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/docker/conftest.py:39 · Destructive file system command detected+ "rm -rf /tmp/podkop-mcp/backups /tmp/forkop-reload /tmp/forkop-fail-reload /tmp/forkop-stopped\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/podkop_mcp/router.py:709 · Destructive file system command detected"trap 'rm -f \"$tmp\"' EXIT",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for podkop-mcp@0.3.0 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mikel38487: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mikel38487Propose a patch to the maintainer