pm-studio-mcp@0.9.6
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "PM Studio MCP Server - A Model Context Protocol server for product managers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DATA_AI_API_KEYFIGMA_TOKENGITHUB_TOKENUNWRAP_ACCESS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: GITHUB_REPO, GREETING_TEMPLATE, UNWRAP_TEAM_ID, WORKING_DIR, WORKING_PATH- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso microsoft.com, azure.com, mobbin.com, figma.com, aka.ms, chromestatus.com, data.ai, reddit.com, unwrap.ai, appmotion.design, pinterest.com, microsoftonline.com, azurewebsites.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names microsoft.com, azure.com, mobbin.com, figma.com, aka.ms, chromestatus.com, data.ai, reddit.com, unwrap.ai, appmotion.design, pinterest.com, microsoftonline.com, azurewebsites.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DATA_AI_API_KEY, FIGMA_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, UNWRAP_ACCESS_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Hex-encoded string detected; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Warning: Do not hardcode sensitive information in production code, you should consider adding environment variables in .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…_path, "wb") as f: f.write(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x08\x02\x00\x00\x00\x90wS\xde\x00\x00\x00\x0bIDATx\x9cc``\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x01\xe2!\xbc3\x00\x00\x00…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.result_remote = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result_local = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."GitHub token is required. Set GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable or pass token parameter.\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["git", "checkout", "--orphan", branch_name], cwd=self.repo_dir, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=20)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Generate catalog.json from screens.json (offline post-processing).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for pm-studio-mcp@0.9.6 as of 52 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hex-encoded string detected≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.