Skills/PyPI/plex-mcp-server

plex-mcp-server@1.5.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Plex Media Server - Control your Plex server via Claude Desktop, Cursor, or any MCP-compatible client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vladimir-tutin · publishing for 33 daysInstalls 1,282Last detonated 12 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCEMCP_OAUTH_ENABLEDMCP_OAUTH_ISSUERMCP_OAUTH_JWKS_CACHE_TTLPLEX_TOKEN or --plex-token / --oauth-enabled / --oauth-issuer / --oauth-audienceConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_SERVER_URL, MCP_TRANSPORT, PLEX_URL
Where it talks to
plex.tv (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED, MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_CACHE_TTL, PLEX_TOKEN and talks to plex.tv. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE=plex.tv,MCP_OAUTH_ENABLED=plex.tv,MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER=plex.tv,MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_CACHE_TTL=plex.tv,PLEX_TOKEN=plex.tv -- uvx plex-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwatcher.py:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplex_mcp_server.py:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Priority: 1) Current directory, 2) Config directory (~/.config/plex-mcp-server/.env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationplex_mcp_server.py:286 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsreturn JSONResponse({"error": f"Failed to proxy token request: {str(e)}"}, status_code=502)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Process kill commandwatcher.py:64 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Create the process in its own process group so we can kill it and all its childrenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplex_mcp_server.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig_env_file = os.path.join(config_dir, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandwatcher.py:137 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Try process group kill as a last resortFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplex_mcp_server.py:423 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Successfully loaded environment variables from .env file", file=sys.stderr)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedwatcher.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplex_mcp_server.py:485 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Warning: Missing Plex configuration. Set PLEX_URL/PLEX_TOKEN via args or .env", file=sys.stderr)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandwatcher.py:132 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# If still running, force killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandwatcher.py:35 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# If still running, force killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈67 tok
1 file · 38 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vladimir-tutin: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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