plaxis-mcp@0.3.5
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Client-neutral stdio MCP server for PLAXIS Remote Scripting" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PLAXIS_PASSWORDor--skip-credentialsConfiguration, not credentials: PLAXIS_HOST, PLAXIS_MCP_TRANSPORT, PLAXIS_PORT, PLAXIS_PRODUCT_VERSION, PLAXIS_PROJECT_DIR, PLAXIS_REQUEST_TIMEOUT, PLAXIS_ROLE, PLAXIS_SCRIPTING_PATH, PLAXIS_TIMEOUT, PROGRAMDATA- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PLAXIS_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."anyone to type the password into the chat. The connect tool takes no "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary>Historical PLAXIS scripting paths — worker-only, never on the host <code>PYTHONPATH</code></summary> <br> ``` C:\ProgramData\Seequent\PLAXIS Python DisFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><b>Source / developer launch only</b> — not a supported deployment path</summary> <br> A clean CPython 3.13 environment can run the module directly witFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.self.assertIn("Do not ask anyone to type the password", message)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for plaxis-mcp@0.3.5 as of 6 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yixuanzhong: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.