platformio.mcp@0.7.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server that lets AI coding agents drive PlatformIO: boards, projects, build, flash, serial monitor, tests, static analysis, libraries." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: PLATFORMIO_CORE_DIR, PLATFORMIO_MCP_ANALYTICS, PLATFORMIO_MCP_ANALYTICS_DIR, PLATFORMIO_MCP_ANALYTICS_URL, PLATFORMIO_MCP_CAPTURE_PROMPTS, PLATFORMIO_MCP_LOG_DIR, PLATFORMIO_MCP_MAX_LOGS, PLATFORMIO_MCP_MODEL, PLATFORMIO_MCP_PIO, PLATFORMIO_MCP_POLICY, PLATFORMIO_MCP_POSTHOG_HOST, PLATFORMIO_MCP_POSTHOG_KEY, PLATFORMIO_MCP_PROJECT_DIR, PLATFORMIO_MCP_REASONING_EFFORT, PLATFORMIO_PACKAGES_DIR, POSTHOG_HOST- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso posthog.com, bit.ly — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names posthog.com, bit.ly as well as its own vendor. The guard injects POSTHOG_PROJECT_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, errors="replace", timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…576:.0f} MB (0x{flash_size:x}).", "Pick a CSV sized for this flash (e.g. default.csv for 4 MB, default_16MB.csv for 16 MB) or set board_upload.flash_size to the real chip size.") elif flash_size - table_end >= 1024…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.subprocess.run(cmd, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return f"no read/write permission on {port}. Add yourself to the serial group (`sudo usermod -aG dialout $USER`, or `uucp` on Arch) and log in again, or `sudo chmod a+rw {port}` for this session."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary><b>Already have PlatformIO?</b></summary> The server finds `platformio` / `pio` on your PATH or in `~/.platformio/penv`. Override with `PLATFORMIO_MCP_Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.Popen(cmd, cwd=cwd, env=env, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", bufsize=1, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.ps = subprocess.run(["ps", "-o", "comm=", "-p", str(pid)], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."LDF: Library Dependency Finder -> https://bit.ly/configure-pio-ldf",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.res = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", project_dir, *args], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return f"no read/write permission on {port}. Add yourself to the serial group (`sudo usermod -aG dialout $USER`, or `uucp` on Arch) and log in again, or `sudo chmod a+rw {port}` for this session."Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=timeout_s + 3).returncode == 0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, errors="replace", timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, errors="replace", timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for platformio.mcp@0.7.0 as of 6 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim powerdragonfire: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.