plant-genomics-mcp@1.31.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Plant genomics MCP — 58 tools across 24 live backends (Ensembl Plants, Phytozome, UniProt, Europe PMC, QuickGO, Planteome, PlantCyc/PMN, g:Profiler, AlphaFold, PDBe, InterPro, JASPAR, ThaleMine, PANTHER, OrthoDB, AraGWAS, 1001 Genomes, BLAST, Gramene, KEGG, STRING, ATTED-II, BAR, MaizeGDB) for MCP clients" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: PGMCP_DENYLIST, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_BATCH_CONCURRENCY, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_CACHE_DISABLED, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_HTTP_HOST, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_HTTP_PORT, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_LIVE, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES, PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_NCBI_EMAIL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso ebi.ac.uk, ensembl.org, kegg.jp, uniprot.org, string-db.org, atted.jp, 1001genomes.org, utoronto.ca, nih.gov, evil.example, europepmc.org, ut.ee, gramene.org, elixir.no, maizegdb.org, orthodb.org, pantherdb.org, doe.gov, plantcyc.org, planteome.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ebi.ac.uk, ensembl.org, kegg.jp, uniprot.org, string-db.org, atted.jp, 1001genomes.org, utoronto.ca, nih.gov, evil.example, europepmc.org, ut.ee, gramene.org, elixir.no, maizegdb.org, orthodb.org, pantherdb.org, doe.gov, plantcyc.org, planteome.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PLANT_GENOMICS_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return subprocess.run(cmd, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False, **kw) # nosec B603 - fixed argv built here, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary>Other install paths (pipx, Docker, from source)</summary> ```bash # pipx — installs the CLI onto your PATH pipx install plant-genomics-mcp claude mcp aFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(["git", *argv], capture_output=True, check=True, env=_git_env())Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.check nosec-needs-reason m.py 'subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True) # nosec' failFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# "TERM", which never matches anything -- a silent pass.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.check nosec-needs-reason n.py 'subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True) # nosec B602 - cmd is a module constant' passFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.check nosec-needs-reason m2.py 'subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True) # nosec B602' failFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.check nosec-needs-reason m3.py 'subprocess.call(cmd, shell=True) # nosec B602 -' failFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.