Skills/PyPI/plane-project-mcp

plane-project-mcp@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Plane (project management) — list/create/update issues and projects from any MCP client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher etumos · publishing for 90 daysInstalls 67Last detonated 28 min ago
$claude mcp add plane-project-mcp -- uvx plane-project-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PLANE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PLANE_API_URL, PLANE_MCP_ENABLED_TOOLS, PLANE_MCP_HOST, PLANE_MCP_HTTP, PLANE_MCP_PORT, PLANE_WORKSPACE_SLUG
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso plane.so — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names plane.so as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PLANE_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx plane-project-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPLANE_API_KEY: "${PLANE_API_KEY:?set PLANE_API_KEY in .env}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 2,567 lines in 17 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for plane-project-mcp@0.1.1 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.