Skills/PyPI/plane-mcp-server

plane-mcp-server@0.3.5

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol server for Plane integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher surya-prashanth-surya.prashanth · publishing for 81 daysInstalls 51,715Last detonated 14 min ago
$claude mcp add plane-mcp-server -- uvx plane-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URIAWS_SECRET_CACHE_TTLELASTICACHE_SECRET_ARNPLANE_API_KEYPLANE_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URISPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_BASE_URLPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_IDPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_SECRETPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ENABLE_CIMDREDIS_AUTH_TOKEN_KEYREDIS_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: AWS_REGION, AWS_ROLE_ARN, LOG_PAYLOADS, LOG_USER_INFO, MCP_PATH_PREFIX, PLANE_BASE_URL, PLANE_INTERNAL_BASE_URL, PLANE_WORKSPACE_SLUG, REDIS_HOST, REDIS_PORT, REDIS_SSL, REDIS_URL
Where it talks to
plane.so (its own)Also my-server.com, cursor.com, vscode.dev, antigravity.google, claude.ai, chatgpt.com, googleusercontent.com, grok.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names my-server.com, cursor.com, vscode.dev, antigravity.google, claude.ai, chatgpt.com, googleusercontent.com, grok.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI, AWS_SECRET_CACHE_TTL, ELASTICACHE_SECRET_ARN, PLANE_API_KEY, PLANE_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URIS, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_BASE_URL, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_ID, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_SECRET, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ENABLE_CIMD, REDIS_AUTH_TOKEN_KEY, REDIS_PASSWORD only into requests to plane.so (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI=plane.so,AWS_SECRET_CACHE_TTL=plane.so,ELASTICACHE_SECRET_ARN=plane.so,PLANE_API_KEY=plane.so,PLANE_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URIS=plane.so,PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_BASE_URL=plane.so,PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_ID=plane.so,PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_SECRET=plane.so,PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ENABLE_CIMD=plane.so,REDIS_AUTH_TOKEN_KEY=plane.so,REDIS_PASSWORD=plane.so -- uvx plane-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
document.cookie accesstests/test_redirect_allowlist.py:63 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies"javascript-scheme": "javascript:alert(document.cookie)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
document.cookie accesstests/test_oauth_security.py:141 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies"javascript:alert(document.cookie)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_aws_secrets.py:384 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsmonkeypatch.setenv("AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI", "http://169.254.170.23/v1/credentials")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 77 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.