plane-ce-mcp@1.1.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Unofficial MCP server for self-hosted Plane (Community Edition)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URIAWS_SECRET_CACHE_TTLELASTICACHE_SECRET_ARNPLANE_API_KEYPLANE_INTERNAL_API_PASSWORDPLANE_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URISPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_BASE_URLPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_IDPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_SECRETPLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ENABLE_CIMDREDIS_AUTH_TOKEN_KEYREDIS_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: AWS_REGION, AWS_ROLE_ARN, LOG_PAYLOADS, LOG_USER_INFO, MCP_PATH_PREFIX, PLANE_BASE_URL, PLANE_INTERNAL_API_EMAIL, PLANE_INTERNAL_BASE_URL, PLANE_MAX_RESPONSE_KB, PLANE_PAGES_MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH, PLANE_TOOLSETS, PLANE_WORKSPACE_SLUG, REDIS_HOST, REDIS_PORT, REDIS_SSL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso plane.so, my-server.com, cursor.com, vscode.dev, antigravity.google, claude.ai, chatgpt.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names plane.so, my-server.com, cursor.com, vscode.dev, antigravity.google, claude.ai, chatgpt.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI, AWS_SECRET_CACHE_TTL, ELASTICACHE_SECRET_ARN, PLANE_API_KEY, PLANE_INTERNAL_API_PASSWORD, PLANE_OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECT_URIS, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_BASE_URL, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_ID, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CLIENT_SECRET, PLANE_OAUTH_PROVIDER_ENABLE_CIMD, REDIS_AUTH_TOKEN_KEY, REDIS_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
monkeypatch.setenv("AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI", "http://169.254.170.23/v1/credentials")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."javascript:alert(document.cookie)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.