Skills/PyPI/pixelbyte-figma-mcp

pixelbyte-figma-mcp@3.3.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for Figma API - Design tokens, gradients, effects, interactions, accessibility checks, Code Connect, and code generation for React, Vue, SwiftUI, Kotlin" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nicepixelbyte · publishing for 273 daysInstalls 161Last detonated 14 min ago
$claude mcp add pixelbyte-figma-mcp -- uvx pixelbyte-figma-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FIGMA_ACCESS_TOKENFIGMA_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FIGMA_CODE_CONNECT_PATH, FIGMA_PIPELINE_V2_SCOPE, FIGMA_PIPELINE_VISUAL_MODE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso figma.com, tailwindcss.com, unpkg.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names figma.com, tailwindcss.com, unpkg.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FIGMA_ACCESS_TOKEN, FIGMA_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pixelbyte-figma-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/plans/2026-01-30-ai-optimized-css-output.md:909 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- Modify: `figma_mcp.py:4716-4736` (Fills markdown bölümü, Task 9'dan sonra)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/plans/2026-01-30-ai-optimized-css-output.md:878 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileText Properties bölümünün sonuna (son `lines.append("")`'dan önce) ekle:Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:59 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/plans/2026-01-30-ai-optimized-css-output.md:913 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFills bölümünün sonuna (`lines.append("")`'dan önce) CSS background satırını ekle:Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/plans/2026-01-30-ai-optimized-css-output.md:552 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file`figma_mcp.py` içinde, line ~4890'dan sonra (Text Properties `lines.append("")` satırından sonra), Implementation Hints bölümünden önce şu kodu ekle:Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈184 tok
2 files · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.