Skills/PyPI/pitchlense-mcp-fastmcp

pitchlense-mcp-fastmcp@1.1.17

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Professional startup risk analysis using MCP and Google Gemini AI" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fastmcp-me · publishing for 411 daysInstalls 44Last detonated 31 min ago
$claude mcp add pitchlense-mcp-fastmcp -- uvx pitchlense-mcp-fastmcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYPERPLEXITY_API_KEYSERPAPI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT, VERTEX_AI_LOCATION
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso perplexity.ai, amanulla.in, hashnode.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names perplexity.ai, amanulla.in, hashnode.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY, PERPLEXITY_API_KEY, SERPAPI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pitchlense-mcp-fastmcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpitchlense_mcp/cli.py:154 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespitchlense-mcp analyze --input startup_data.json --output results.jsonFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

No other findings across 9,390 lines in 55 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈58 tok
1 file · 55 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pitchlense-mcp-fastmcp@1.1.17 as of 9 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.