Skills/PyPI/pinterest-mcp-docker

pinterest-mcp-docker@0.2.6

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Hardened, containerized MCP server for Pinterest API v5 — create pins, manage boards, track analytics" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sinalkar · publishing for 65 daysInstalls 113Last detonated 15 min ago
$claude mcp add pinterest-mcp-docker -- uvx pinterest-mcp-docker
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DATABASE_URLPINTEREST_ACCESS_TOKENPINTEREST_CLIENT_SECRETPINTEREST_REFRESH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_TRANSPORT, PINTEREST_CLIENT_ID, XDG_STATE_HOME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso pinterest.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names pinterest.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DATABASE_URL, PINTEREST_ACCESS_TOKEN, PINTEREST_CLIENT_SECRET, PINTEREST_REFRESH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pinterest-mcp-docker

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialskeycloak-broker-extension/src/test/java/com/pheniox/keycloak/broker/pinterest/PinterestIdentityProviderTest.java:148 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/credentials",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/pinterest_mcp/logging_setup.py:71 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception: # pragma: no cover - malformed args shouldn't kill loggingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/pinterest_mcp/config.py:192 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfield, which is an awkward shape for a `.env` file or `docker run -e`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.