pinion-mcp@0.3.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "AI-Powered Characterization Test Generator MCP — lock legacy Python behavior into pytest so you can refactor safely." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYGOOGLE_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYPINION_GATEWAY_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PINION_GATEWAY_URL, PINION_LLM_MAX_RETRIES, PINION_LLM_MODEL, PINION_LLM_PROVIDER, PINION_LLM_TEMPERATURE, PINION_LOG_LEVEL, PINION_OLLAMA_URL, PINION_RLIMIT_CPU, PINION_RLIMIT_MEMORY_MB- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, PINION_GATEWAY_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 — controlled argvFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 — controlled argvFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Coverage strategy you must follow, in order of priority:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Coverage strategy you must follow, in order of priority:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.