pinemcp@1.0.5
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "PineScript v6 MCP server - 6 tools for docs lookup, code validation, and code generation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_API_KEYMCP_API_KEYSConfiguration, not credentials: FILE_VALIDATION_CACHE_SIZE, FILE_VALIDATION_CACHE_TTL, HOT_CACHE_NAMESPACES, LAZY_MODEL, LOG_DIR, PINE_COMPILE_HARD_TIMEOUT, PINE_EMBED_MODEL, PINE_EXPLAIN_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT, PINE_EXPLAIN_MAX_DOC_LOOKUPS, PINE_FACADE_FALLBACK_ENABLED, PINE_FACADE_URL, PINESCRIPT_COLLECTION, PINESCRIPT_DB_PATH, PINESCRIPT_INDEX_BATCH_SIZE, TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso tradingview.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names tradingview.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_API_KEY, MCP_API_KEYS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"""Hot-reload API keys from api_keys.json. Requires admin role."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."display_name": "math.log(number) → input float",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why._env_file = _server_dir / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.await pine_compile(file_path="/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."url": "https://www.tradingview.com/pine-script-reference/v6/#const_location.top",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."""Hot-reload API keys from api_keys.json. Returns new key count."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# API key loading (supports hot-reload from api_keys.json)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for pinemcp@1.0.5 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.