pii-mcp@1.13.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Pattern-based PII redaction for MCP servers — FastMCP middleware (Tier 1)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso irs.gov, nhs.uk, gov.uk, x.gov.uk, huggingface.co — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
commit = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], input=text, text=True, env=env, timeout=REDOS_LIMIT_S, check=True)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Numbered steps a reviewer can run, or "n/a" for docs-only / pure refactors.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.text = "call +\u0663\u0661 \u0662\u0660 \u0661\u0662\u0663\u0664\u0665\u0666\u0667 now"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.common = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.