pidgey-mcp@2.1.6
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Token-Optimized Middleware Engine & DOM Checkpointing Framework for AI Browser Automation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GROQ_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOW_HYBRID_NAVIGATION, ASYNC_CHECKPOINTING, AUTO_OPEN_DASHBOARD, BROWSER_TIMEOUT, CACHE_ENABLED, CACHE_MAX_SIZE, CACHE_TTL, CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL, CHECKPOINT_RETENTION_DAYS, CLASSIFICATION_THRESHOLD, DASHBOARD_PORT, ENABLE_CHECKPOINTING, ENABLE_DIRECT_FETCH, ENABLE_LLMS_DISCOVERY, FALLBACK_TO_BROWSER, GROQ_VISION_MODEL, HEADLESS, LLMS_CACHE_TTL, MAX_CHECKPOINTS, MAX_LLMS_SIZE, MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION, MINIMUM_RESUME_CONFIDENCE, REDIS_URL, SIMILARITY_THRESHOLD, TOOLS_LIST_CACHE_SCOPE, TOOLS_LIST_TTL_MS, VISUAL_FALLBACK_THRESHOLD, WEBSOCKET_HOST, WEBSOCKET_PORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso groq.com, google.com, ycombinator.com, openxmlformats.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names groq.com, google.com, ycombinator.com, openxmlformats.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GROQ_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Token Compression & Rule Decision (Feature 6 & 7)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Browser Optimizer MCP reduced inference latency by <strong>85%</strong> and compressed token overhead by <strong>93.4%</strong>.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Token Optimization & Rule DecisionFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Loads environment variables from .env file and sets defaults.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.