pi-mcp-py@0.4.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Connects the MCP servers an ACP client passes to the pi-python agent (an extension)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"http://198.51.100.1/mcp",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.url="https://user:pa%24%[email protected]/mcp/0123456789abcdef0123?token=tok-123&x=1",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.s = server(transport="http", url="https://user:[email protected]:8443/path/tok?key=v")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."http://198.51.100.1/mcp",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."http://192.0.2.5:8000/mcp", # a documentation address (RFC 5737)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."https://user:pw@localhost/mcp?k=v",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."http://192.0.2.5:8000/mcp", # a documentation address (RFC 5737)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.stem = transport.log_stem("../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert stem == transport.log_stem("../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for pi-mcp-py@0.4.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.