Skills/PyPI/phonectl-mcp

phonectl-mcp@0.1.5

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that lets AI agents see and drive a real iPhone over USB: screenshots, on-screen text, taps, swipes, typing, apps." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jiefeng-ai · publishing for 4 daysInstalls 622Last detonated 2 h ago
$claude mcp add phonectl-mcp -- uvx phonectl-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PHONECTL_TOKEN_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: PHONECTL_CALL_TIMEOUT, PHONECTL_KEY_IDLE, PHONECTL_LOG, PHONECTL_OCR_LANGS, PHONECTL_PORT, PHONECTL_SCALE, PHONECTL_SETTLE, PHONECTL_TOUCH_IDLE, PHONECTL_UDID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PHONECTL_TOKEN_FILE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx phonectl-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/phonectl/cli.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["launchctl", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=check)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.zh-CN.md:124 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>环境变量(设好后重新运行 <code>phonectl install-service</code>;<code>restart</code> 沿用旧值)</summary> | 变量 | 默认值 | 含义 | | --- | --- | --- | | `PHONECTL_UDID` | 第一台连上Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:34 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- An iPhone on **iOS 27 or later**, with Developer Mode onFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/phonectl/cli.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["lsof", "-nP", f"-iTCP:{port}", "-sTCP:LISTEN"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:56 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction filephonectl doctor # checks cable, trust, Developer Mode, disk image and serverFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:124 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Environment variables (set them, then run <code>phonectl install-service</code> again; <code>restart</code> keeps the old values)</summary> | Variable Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:111 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| No Developer Mode switch | Run `phonectl doctor --fix`; the switch appears under Settings › Privacy & Security |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:56 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction filephonectl doctor # checks cable, trust, Developer Mode, disk image and serverFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:111 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file| No Developer Mode switch | Run `phonectl doctor --fix`; the switch appears under Settings › Privacy & Security |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:34 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- An iPhone on **iOS 27 or later**, with Developer Mode onFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈68 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for phonectl-mcp@0.1.5 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.