phone-mcp@0.3.6
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "A phone control plugin for MCP that allows you to control your Android phone through ADB commands to connect any human" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AMAP_MAPS_API_KEY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso amap.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names amap.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AMAP_MAPS_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(pull_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.match = re.search(r"UI hierchary dumped to: (.*\.xml)", output)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for phone-mcp@0.3.6 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.