Skills/PyPI/pgvector-mcp-server

pgvector-mcp-server@1.0.6

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for PostgreSQL vector database management with pgvector extension" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher your-name-your.email · publishing for 593 daysInstalls 93Last detonated 3 h ago
$claude mcp add pgvector-mcp-server -- uvx pgvector-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DASHSCOPE_API_KEYDATABASE_URLConfiguration, not credentials: DASHSCOPE_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso aliyuncs.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names aliyuncs.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DASHSCOPE_API_KEY, DATABASE_URL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pgvector-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Context shift attemptCLAUDE.md:288 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode- `DEBUG`: Enable debug mode (default: false)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/run_tests.py:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=Path(__file__).parent.parent)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_encoding.py:125 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsbinary_content = b'\x00\x01\x02\x03\xff\xfe\xfd'Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.specify/scripts/bash/update-agent-context.sh:106 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/manual_additions_$$Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.specify/scripts/bash/update-agent-context.sh:105 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/agent_update_*_$$Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:533 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Set DASHSCOPE_API_KEY in .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:116 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCreate `.env` file in project root for environment variables:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_encoding.py:174 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsbinary_content = b'\xff\xfe\x48\x00\x65\x00\x6c\x00\x6c\x00\x6f\x00' # UTF-16 LEFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,213 tok
2 files · 70 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pgvector-mcp-server@1.0.6 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.