Skills/PyPI/pgops-mcp

pgops-mcp@0.1.9

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Production-grade MCP server: safe, audited PostgreSQL operations + Docker environment awareness for AI agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher arzharch · publishing for 80 daysInstalls 157Last detonated 3 h ago
$claude mcp add pgops-mcp -- uvx pgops-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PGOPS_DSNPGOPS_READONLY_DSNConfiguration, not credentials: PGOPS_AUDIT_LOG, PGOPS_HEALTH_PORT, PGOPS_METRICS_PORT, PGOPS_OTEL_ENDPOINT
Where it talks to
pgops-mcp.local (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PGOPS_DSN, PGOPS_READONLY_DSN and talks to pgops-mcp.local. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets PGOPS_DSN=pgops-mcp.local,PGOPS_READONLY_DSN=pgops-mcp.local -- uvx pgops-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/pgops/prompts.py:80 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesand report what it is running. Do not kill anything without explicit approval.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/pgops/observability.py:23 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files- `pgops.db.up` gauge — last known reachability of PostgresFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈62 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pgops-mcp@0.1.9 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.