personal-mcp-arun@1.0.5
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Your AI-powered personal desktop assistant — MCP server for Gmail, Calendar, files, clipboard, apps, browser, and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GCAL_CREDENTIALS_PATHGCAL_TOKEN_PATHGMAIL_CREDENTIALS_PATHGMAIL_TOKEN_PATHTWITTER_ACCESS_SECRETTWITTER_ACCESS_TOKENTWITTER_API_KEYTWITTER_API_SECRETTWITTER_BEARER_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso ipify.org, google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ipify.org, google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GCAL_CREDENTIALS_PATH, GCAL_TOKEN_PATH, GMAIL_CREDENTIALS_PATH, GMAIL_TOKEN_PATH, TWITTER_ACCESS_SECRET, TWITTER_ACCESS_TOKEN, TWITTER_API_KEY, TWITTER_API_SECRET, TWITTER_BEARER_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(["pbpaste"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["powershell", "-command", "Get-Clipboard"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["pbcopy"], input=text.encode(), check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["xclip", "-selection", "clipboard", "-o"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for personal-mcp-arun@1.0.5 as of 57 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.