Skills/PyPI/performance-ai-mcp

performance-ai-mcp@1.0.8

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Performance Ai automation via MCP. Includes analyze waterfall data, suggest optimizations, calculate core web vitals. By MEOK AI Labs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher csoai-org · publishing for 214 daysInstalls 212Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add performance-ai-mcp -- uvx performance-ai-mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso stripe.com, meok.ai, smithery.ai, councilof.ai, proofof.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx performance-ai-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · at async onImport.tracePromise.__proto__ (node:internal/modules/esm/loader:680:25) { code: 'ERR_UNKNOWN_FILE_EXTENSION' } Node.js v22.23.5
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/mcp-smithery-publish.yml:33 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @smithery/cli mcp publish "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}" -n nicholastempleman/${{ github.event.repository.name }} --jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)mcp-wrapper.py:85 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server.run(transport="streamable-http")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈73 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for performance-ai-mcp@1.0.8 as of 55 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.