Skills/PyPI/peon-mcp

peon-mcp@0.9.66

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for tracking software project tasks in PostgreSQL" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 65Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add peon-mcp -- uvx peon-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKENDATABASE_URLDISCORD_BOT_TOKENS_DIRDO_SPACES_SECRETGH_TOKENGITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRETGITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHNYX_GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATHPEON_API_KEYPEON_AUTH_CALLBACK_URLSESSION_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: DO_SPACES_BUCKET, DO_SPACES_ENDPOINT, DO_SPACES_KEY, DO_SPACES_REGION, GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_ID, GITHUB_APP_ID, GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID, NYX_GITHUB_APP_ID, NYX_GITHUB_APP_INSTALLATION_ID, PEON_API_URL, PEON_AUTO_MERGE_ENABLED, PEON_AUTO_MERGE_METHOD, PEON_LOG_LEVEL, PEON_LOKI_URL, PEON_MAX_TOOL_RESULT_CHARS, PEON_S3_PRESIGN_TTL, PEON_TOOL_RESULT_TTL_MINUTES, PEON_UI_HOST, PEON_UI_ORIGIN, PEON_UI_PORT, PUBLIC_LEADS_PROJECT_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso digitaloceanspaces.com, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names digitaloceanspaces.com, claude.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, DATABASE_URL, DISCORD_BOT_TOKENS_DIR, DO_SPACES_SECRET, GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_APP_CLIENT_SECRET, GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, NYX_GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, PEON_API_KEY, PEON_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL, SESSION_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx peon-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpeon_mcp/loop.py:750 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpeon_mcp/hooks/common.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandpeon_mcp/loop.py:1479 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processessubsequent iterations can kill a stale agent. Returns a tuple ofFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialspeon_mcp/loop.py:431 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingreturn url.replace("https://github.com/", f"https://x-access-token:{token}@github.com/", 1)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpeon_mcp/loop.py:453 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpeon_mcp/loop.py:1583 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpeon_mcp/loop.py:475 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpeon_mcp/loop.py:480 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,199 tok
10 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for peon-mcp@0.9.66 as of 57 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.