pbix-mcp@0.9.153
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for creating, reading, writing, and evaluating Power BI .pbix/.pbit files — no Power BI Desktop required" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openxmlformats.org, microsoft.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hex-encoded string detected; Hex-encoded string detected; Hex-encoded string detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
TAG_CP_OPEN = b"\x3C\x31\x3A\x43\x50\x00" # <1:CP\0Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own._TAG_CS_OPEN = b"\x3C\x31\x3A\x43\x53\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own._TAG_CS_CLOSE = b"\x43\x53\x3A\x31\x3E\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own._TAG_SS_CLOSE = b"\x53\x53\x3A\x31\x3E\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."ab" has two (SEARCH("ab", ...) is 1, SEARCH("a?b", ...) fails).Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._TAG_SS_OPEN = b"\x3C\x31\x3A\x53\x53\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.TAG_CP_CLOSE = b"\x43\x50\x3A\x31\x3E\x00" # CP:1>\0Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own._TAG_CP_OPEN = b"\x3C\x31\x3A\x43\x50\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."e") and SEARCH("?" & U+0301, "e" & U+0300) are 1, probes Q2a, Q2b). Unsortable characters weigh nothing ("b" finds "b")."""Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.TAG_SS_OPEN = b"\x3C\x31\x3A\x53\x53\x00" # <1:SS\0Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.zf.writestr(zi, b"/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.TAG_CS_OPEN = b"\x3C\x31\x3A\x43\x53\x00" # <1:CS\0Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.assert server._sanitize_item_name("../../etc/passwd", "png") == "passwd.png"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.TAG_CS_CLOSE = b"\x43\x53\x3A\x31\x3E\x00" # CS:1>\0Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.JPEG = b"\xff\xd8\xff\xe0\x00\x10JFIF" + b"\x00" * 32 + b"\xff\xd9"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for pbix-mcp@0.9.153 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim d0nk3yhm: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hex-encoded string detected≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.