Skills/PyPI/pawangunjkar-linux-ssh-mcp

pawangunjkar-linux-ssh-mcp@1.0.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for SSH operations on remote Linux machines — 50+ tools for file management, system monitoring, Docker, networking, and more" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pawangunjkar · publishing for 105 daysInstalls 61Last detonated 2 h ago
$claude mcp add pawangunjkar-linux-ssh-mcp -- uvx pawangunjkar-linux-ssh-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SSH_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: SSH_HOST, SSH_KEY_PATH, SSH_MCP_CACHE_DIR, SSH_PORT, SSH_USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SSH_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pawangunjkar-linux-ssh-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:984 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescmd = f"id {username} && echo '---' && grep '^{username}:' /etc/passwd && echo '---' && groups {username}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:2267 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file# Avoid giving root access unless absolutely necessaryFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandserver.py:669 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processespid: Process ID to killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:971 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescmd = "awk -F: '$3 >= 1000 || $3 == 0 {printf \"%-20s UID=%-6s HOME=%s SHELL=%s\\n\", $1, $3, $6, $7}' /etc/passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscredential_store.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. Local file cache (~/.ssh-mcp-cache/credentials.json)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandserver.py:404 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsreturn _ssh.execute(f"chown {flag} {ownership} {path} && echo 'Owner changed: {path} → {ownership}'", session_name=session_name)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandserver.py:673 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesresult = _ssh.execute(f"kill -{signal} {pid} 2>&1 && echo 'Process {pid} killed with signal {signal}'", session_name=session_name)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandserver.py:387 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsreturn _ssh.execute(f"chmod {flag} {permissions} {path} && echo 'Permissions set: {path} → {permissions}'", session_name=session_name)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈77 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pawangunjkar-linux-ssh-mcp@1.0.0 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.